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The emergence of the independent labour movement in the 1970s led to the 
development of distinctive trade union structures that reflected the need to break with 
traditional bureaucratic organisational models. Many attributed the rapid growth of the 
South African labour movement in the 1980s to the vitality of local democratic 
structures and institutionalised mechanisms of worker control. While observers like 
Michels2 and others had long bemoaned the decline of internal democracy as unions 
matured, periodic surveys of COSATU (the Congress of South African Trade Unions) 
members since 1993 have demonstrated the vitality of union democracy at the 
workplace.3 
The constitutions of COSATU and its affiliates all provide formally that control lies in 
the hands of directly-elected worker representatives who dominate decision-making 
structures. The model of worker control was developed primarily to serve the interests 
of small local union structures, to ensure that officials operated with mandates from the 
membership and to protect the organisation from state and employer repression. As 
unions grew rapidly and merged in the 1980s, direct worker control became less 
practical and was replaced by a governance model of representative democracy that 
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combined direct control of elected local representatives with regional and national 
committee structures where full-time officials were held accountable to elected 
representatives.  
The constitutional entrenchment of worker control and these democratic practices in 
COSATU and its affiliates created direct linkages between the grassroots and national 
decision-making structures. 4  In the late 1980s COSATU’s increased political 
involvement was to a great extent in response to pressure from the membership. 
Despite this, direct worker control rarely extended beyond the workplace as ordinary 
members only participated indirectly through their elected representatives in the 
election of regional and national union leaders.5 Over time, as unions grew, full-time 
appointed officials and full-time elected leaders have become increasingly powerful and 
further removed from worker control. As they matured, COSATU and its affiliated 
unions seem to have taken on some of the oligarchic characteristics that their 
organisational design sought to avoid.  
An overwhelming majority of members supported COSATU’s participation in the 
national democratic struggle and the federation became an exemplar of social 
movement unionism, bridging the divide between economic, community and political 
struggles at local, regional and national levels.6 The rapid growth of COSATU and its 
affiliates following mergers in the late 1980s, coupled with a dramatic increase in issues 
on the labour movement’s national bargaining and political agenda during the transition 
to democracy, put pressure on an organisational model that had primarily been 
developed to deal with local issues.  
In an apparent contradiction, the arrival of political democracy in 1994 has been 
associated with a decline in the intensity and vitality of local union democracy. 
Similarly, the broader society has been characterised by the demobilisation of many 
social movements. While social movement theorists tend to consider movement and 
institution as separate, every movement carries with it the embryo of an institution. 
Movement success leads to a change of focus as the goal of any democratic movement is 
to capture power, institutionalise its policy agenda and consolidate its gains.7  
Although the intensity and vitality of union democracy may have waned, by 
international standards three previous iterations of this survey8 found that workers and 
shop stewards sustained very high levels of participation in local union activities and 
supported a vibrant model of worker control at the workplace. The results reported 
here, which draw on the fourth leg of a longitudinal survey of COSATU members and 
shop stewards conducted in 2008/2009, suggest a continuation of this pattern.  
From the late 1980s COSATU engaged directly in national politics, complementing its 
shop-floor strength and grassroots links to local community organisations with national 
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alliances with other social and political organisations. These links were formalised 
through the Tripartite Alliance with the African National Congress (ANC) and South 
African Communist Party (SACP) after the unbanning of liberation organisations in 
1990.9 During the first decade of democratic politics, earlier iterations of this survey 
indicated a steady decline in support for the Tripartite Alliance from an overwhelming 
82% of respondents to 66%.10 The results reported here suggest that this pattern 
continues, with clear evidence that COSATU has strengthened its links with the SACP.  
This paper explores the trends in the practice of shop-floor democracy over the past 
fifteen years and the relationship between worker experience of trade union 
democracy, their participation in union activities, their attitudes towards the 
involvement of COSATU in politics and their own conceptions of political democracy. In 
particular the paper compares the attitudes of ordinary members with those of their 
elected representatives who constitute a significant component of the respondents, 
providing an opportunity to explore the extent to which their interests coincide and 
diverge, and how these patterns have changed over the past decade. A particularly 
interesting new question on membership of the SACP provides an opportunity to 
explore the nature of the influence of the SACP and the influence of its members on 
union democracy. 
 
2.  TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY 
The existence of democratic union structures and operations at the local or workplace 
level provides ordinary members with the opportunity to participate directly in 
exercising worker control over their elected shop stewards, and indirectly over the 
policies of the union and office-bearers at the local, provincial and national levels. The 
presence of a responsive and accountable shop steward structure should encourage 
further member participation in the union, both formally and informally.11  
More frequent participation in union meetings not only enables members to exercise 
greater influence and control over union policies12 but also empowers them and boosts 
their confidence to participate more broadly in politics and in their communities. This 
relationship is best regarded as reciprocal as participation in union meetings is also 
likely to be positively influenced by participation in political and community 
organisations.13  
Participation in local union organisation is also likely to influence the political 
outlook of members. Lipset, Trow and Coleman14 argued that these serve as “arenas 
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within which new ideas are generated” and “networks through which people may learn 
and form attitudes about politics.” Through debate and discussion in union, community 
and political meetings at the local level workers are exposed to diverse ideas and 
develop shared beliefs and understandings of government policies as well as other 
social and political issues.  
Participation in union activities and a responsive shop steward structure at the 
workplace builds loyalty to trade unionism through participation, socialisation and 
service delivery. The involvement of workers in community and political structures, 
coupled with their loyalty to the labour movement, provides the foundation for a set of 
interlocking organisational and political relationships that strengthen partnerships with 
like-minded allies to advance the interests of workers and the working class more 
broadly.15  
2.1  Social movement unionism and worker control  
The label of social movement unionism was first applied to describe the model of union 
organisation practiced by South African unions that emerged in the 1970s and 
flourished in the 1980s. Combining the workplace organisational strength and collective 
bargaining focus of economic trade unionism with modes of collective action and 
societal consciousness typical of social movements, social movement unionism links 
factory-based production politics with community and state power issues.16 As an ideal-
type, social movement unionism embraces an enduring commitment to participatory 
democracy and political independence and is distinguished by a “bottom-up” organising 
model that places control of the union in the hands of the members and their 
representatives, in contrast to the “top-down” model of organising where union leaders 
and officials exercise control. 
At the local level social movement unionism is not only embedded in the workplace 
but is linked to local political and community organisations and movements, where a 
common agenda to transform society in the interests of the working class is pursued. In 
this way unions are not just organisations but form part of a larger movement, and 
through these linkages a distinctive and transformative union identity may be forged 
and promoted.17 
Union democracy and worker control need to be understood in the context of the 
distinctive union social structure that has developed in South African workplaces.18 The 
union social structure comprises the formal institutional framework, including its 
constitution, offices, resources and the rules and procedures that govern shop steward 
elections and roles, as well as a range of informal relationships, practices and meanings 
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around them. The union social structure is influenced by a range of societal and political 
factors beyond the workplace and “governs the distribution of power between 
members, shop stewards, officials and its various structures, and defines the practices, 
processes of decision making, strategies, goals and organisational culture of the 
union”.19 
Conventional analysis of unions in advanced industrialised societies identifies 
bureaucratisation and the centralisation of power as inevitable features of mature trade 
unionism. In his seminal study of the social democratic party, Michels20 concluded that 
even organisations with the most democratic ambitions, political parties, inevitably 
displayed bureaucratic tendencies. Michels's “iron law of oligarchy” argues that, as 
democratic organisations grow, they undergo subtle organisational changes: the decline 
of participation leads to member passivity and the professionalisation of the 
organisational machinery, which results in the ascendance to power of a bureaucratic 
oligarchy. The monopoly of political skills in the hands of the leadership is one of the 
chief factors perpetuating their power.21  
Two distinctive features characterised the organisational model of South African 
unions that emerged in the 1970s and thrived in the decade thereafter. The combination 
of high levels of direct participation in local union activities and worker control of union 
officials through elected representatives sought to counteract oligarchic tendencies. But, 
when COSATU affiliates merged to form large national unions, the democratic ideals of 
worker control and direct participation became impractical and representative 
democracy increasingly replaced direct participation.22  However, there are risks 
involved in this development. As Lange has argued, representative democracy is a 
pragmatic model that only comes close to these ideals if “tempered by a keen awareness 
of the desirability for the most rank and file participation possible consistent with 
effective promotion of interests”.23 
After COSATU was established and its affiliates founded through a series of mergers 
in the late 1980s there seemed to be ample evidence that union growth does not 
necessarily lead to membership passivity or the ascendance of an oligarchy. Two 
decades later, COSATU’s representative democratic organisational model still remains 
in place. However, the functioning of systems of democratic control depends on how 
these structures operate in practice, the extent of mobilisation and participation by 
rank-and-file membership (rather than their elected representatives), and whether or 
not a non-representative faction or oligarchy has ascended to fill the democratic space 
left by declining participation.  
The origins of the organisational model in COSATU can be traced back to labour 
movement entrepreneurs, who revived unions in the 1970s and sought to avoid the 
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perceived failures of unions in the 1950s, when the demands of the political alliance to 
the ANC tended to be prioritised over the development democratic grassroots 
organisational structures. They also drew on the experience of the British shop steward 
movement and the participatory ethos of new social movements.24 In the absence of 
legal political organisations, and to protect themselves against state repression, the 
unions built democratic organisations based on worker representation and control.25  
By building a democratic organisational culture from the bottom up, “worker 
control” sought to break with traditional representative organisational forms and 
emphasised direct democracy, accountability of delegates, open debate, education of 
activists, and worker participation in decision-making.26 Buhlungu notes that union 
democracy and democratic union traditions take on particular forms because of the 
context within which they emerge and develop and a wide range of cultural, traditional, 
political and intellectual influences.27 This democratic union culture comprised a set of 
practices and organisational values that permeated every aspect of union organisation 
and functioning, which entailed:  
(a) the emphasis on shop floor structures led by shop stewards; 
(b) the creation of representative decision-making structures with majority worker 
delegates; 
(c) mandated decision-making and regular report-backs to members; 
(d) firm-level bargaining so workers and stewards can control the bargaining agenda 
and agreements; 
(e) full-time officials subjected to control by worker-dominated structures; and 
(f) the involvement of workers in the employment of full-time officials.28 
Once institutionalised, the organisational characteristics of unions, like other 
organisations,, tend to resist adaptation to new conditions.29 Consequently, these 
principles have endured in the governance structures of COSATU and its affiliates. 
Consequently, the original organisational models and the political culture that 
characterised the unions that emerged in the 1970s became imprinted in the 
organisational forms of COSATU affiliates today.  
2.2  Defining union democracy  
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What is meant by "union democracy" or by what standards should it be measured? Two 
of the four models of union democracy identified by Morris and Fosh,30 namely liberal 
pluralism and grassroots activism, predominate in the literature. The authors argue that 
each model considers five elements: constitutional arrangements, political organisation, 
representation, membership involvement and outcomes for members. Writing from a 
perspective that combines elements of liberal pluralism and grassroots activism, 
Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin31 identify three basic features of union democracy: 
1. A democratic constitution that guarantees of basic civil liberties and political 
rights;  
2. The freedom of members to debate and criticise and union officials and to 
organise, oppose and replace officials through freely contested elections; and  
3. Maximum participation by members in exercising power and in making 
decisions which affect them.  
Conventional approaches to union democracy tend to emphasise the first two features, 
which are characteristic of the liberal pluralist approach which focuses on formal 
structures and measures such as the constitutional ability of the rank and file to affect 
decisions, influence policy and change leaders, or the responsiveness of leaders to 
members' demands.  
However, as Flanders observed, unions are a mixture of organisation and movement, 
requiring organisation for their collective bargaining power and movement for their 
vitality.32 Undue stress on the institutional framework can deflect attention away from 
the importance of activist rank-and-file participation which is essential, not only to 
ensure that members’ interests are advanced but also to defend the membership 
against oligarchy.33  
In the South African context it was relatively easy to entrench a democratic union 
structure and culture because these principles complemented the democratic goals of 
the liberation movement.34 Unusually the movement’s early full-time officials were 
political activists committed to building union democracy and developing a cadre of 
worker leaders. However, the rapid growth of COSATU affiliates following mergers in 
the late 1980s, coupled with the federation’s rapidly expanding national bargaining and 
political agenda, put pressure on an organisational model that had been developed to 
deal with local issues.  
Over time, continued union growth and maturity led to the erosion of direct 
democracy and increasing reliance on representative democracy through elected shop 
stewards. It also resulted in a growing gap between workers and shop stewards and 
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between workers and the leadership at branch, regional and national levels. The steady 
erosion of worker control over policy issues that were remote from the shop-floor was 
already identified in the early 1990s by Marie, who also noted that democratic 
structures had often become top-down communication conduits rather than mandating 
channels.35   
Democratic worker control is thus necessary, but not sufficient, to ensure that 
leaders remain accountable and the movement advances the interests of members. 
Unless supplemented by active rank-and-file participation, the institutionalisation of 
worker control is not a sufficient defence against oligarchic union leadership. It is the 
active involvement and participation of members that ensures that organised labour 
retains its movement character and advances its social purpose and the interests of the 
membership. 
While mandating representatives and holding them accountable through periodic 
feedback and the power to recall are important checks and balances in any system of 
representative democracy, another important factor is the extent to which the views of 
ordinary members and their elected representatives are aligned. This may be 
particularly important when representatives act with broad mandates and are not 
expected to provide in-depth report backs. Consequently, an important dimension of 
the empirical analysis in this article, which has not previously been explored in the 
South African context, is to consider the similarity and differences between ordinary 
members and shop stewards in depth.  
In discussing democracy in the union context it is necessary to draw on the 
conventional distinction between participatory democracy, where individual members 
are directly involved in decision-making, and representative democracy, where 
decisions are made by elected representatives. The line between the two is anything but 
clear, however, as participatory and representative democratic practices often 
complement one another in practice, for example when collective agreements are 
negotiated by elected representatives and ratified by ballot. 
Union democracy can best be assessed by the opportunities that members have to 
participate in decisions that affect them, their ability to influence policy, exercise control 
over their representatives and hold them accountable, and by the responsiveness of 
representatives and leaders to their demands.36 As Strauss argues, union democracy is 
not only desirable because it enhances member control over the office-bearers, but also 
because “on balance democracy increases union effectiveness in representing members' 
interests and in mobilising these members to support its collective bargaining 
objectives.” 37  
Because direct democracy is feasible only on the shop floor, where large numbers of 
members can participate personally, effective representative democracy depends on the 
accountability of representatives and the responsiveness of leaders. Ensuring 
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responsive leadership requires that members are in a position to oppose their leaders' 
policies and to change their leaders if they become non-responsive.  
The balance between representative and participative democracy depends on the 
mandate that members allow their elected representatives and the extent to which they 
are expected to consult with and report back to members. As unions have grown and 
representative democracy has necessarily replaced participatory democracy, so in 
assessing the extent of membership control one must distinguish between control over 
decisions and control over representatives.38 At the local level democracy may erode 
and an oligarchy emerge unless members actively enforce accountability of their 
representatives by requiring ongoing mandating and consultation, and replacing those 
who fail to perform and conform to expectations.  
Even in highly democratic organisations the de facto power of members varies 
according to their personal interest in outcomes and the extent to which they are 
directly affected by decisions. Leaders are more likely to be held closely accountable on 
contractual negotiations than over policy and political issues.39 As the Organisational 
Report to the 10th COSATU National Congress notes, internal democracy is weakened by 
“poor attendance at constitutional meetings, though affiliates still maintain effective 
mandating and report-back systems for collective bargaining”.40  
In their classical study, Lipset et al adopt a liberal-democratic perspective and 
identify the existence of competing parties or factions as essential to functioning 
democracy. 41 The principle on which this critical factor is founded is the existence of 
autonomous centres of power that create the conditions necessary for opposition to 
officials and an independent organisational base for rank-and-file activists. Stepan-
Norris argues that, even in organisational contexts that are not conducive to democracy, 
the introduction of radical ideology and factions based on outside organisations can 
provide structural support for internal democracy.42  If these factions are based on 
ideological differences that are aligned to worker interests they may stimulate and 
maintain interest and participation. The alliance between COSATU and the SACP 
highlights the potential importance of this dimension of influence over democratic 
processes within COSATU and its affiliates.  
Some proponents of business or economic unionism have argued that the purpose of 
unions is to protect and advance the living standards of members rather than provide 
members with experience in self-government.43 However, even from a functionalist 
perspective one can argue that democracy can increase union effectiveness in a number 
of ways and for a number of reasons. Elected leaders are more likely to know what their 
members want and thus better represent their interests. Democratic processes help to 
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recruit and develop voluntary leadership which can improve service delivery at the 
local level. The power to recall elected representatives makes it easier for the union to 
eliminate ineffective office-bearers or those who fail to represent member interests 
adequately. Finally, grassroots organisers may assist in organising and mobilising 
members.  
2.3  Measures of union democracy 
Strauss identifies a number of operational measures of union democracy.44 At the most 
basic level South Africa unions all pass the legal test in that their constitutions provide 
for the regular election of officers. Another test relates to whether or not members can 
run for office and speak in opposition to the leadership without fear of reprisal. Third, 
various measures reflect whether or not the right to participate is used and whether 
incumbent representatives or officer-bearers are defeated.  
No empirical research has systematically documented the extent of contestation or 
whether office-bearers in South African trade unions have been defeated in elections. 
Constrained by the focus of the survey on the views of ordinary members, this article 
considers measures of individual participation as well as measures of responsiveness 
and influence. Do members feel they have some "say in how things are decided"?45 To 
what extent can they influence union decisions?46 Do shop stewards and office-bearers 
share the values and priorities of their members? 
We begin by considering the trends in member attitudes towards steward 
accountability and an analysis of participation levels in union activities. In order to 
better understand the extent to which stewards are true representatives, the paper 
compares the responses of ordinary members and shop stewards on a wide a range of 
issues. Finally, the potential influence of SACP membership is explored to better 
understand the impact of the alliance on union democratic practice. 
3.  METHOD 
The data reported here represents the fourth iteration of a project titled Taking 
Democracy Seriously, the only regular nationwide survey of members of affiliates of 
South Africa’s pre-eminent trade union federation, COSATU. The study was initiated by 
a group of labour scholars at the universities of Cape Town, Natal, Port Elizabeth, 
Rhodes and Witwatersrand in 199447 and was repeated before each general election 
since then that is, in 199848, 200449 and between November 2008 and February 2009. 
The most recent survey was coordinated by the Sociology of Work Unit (SWOP) and 
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implemented by academics at the universities of Natal, Port Elizabeth, Fort Hare, 
Western Cape and the Witwatersrand. As with previous iterations, the 2008/9 survey 
adopted a national stratified sampling methodology, with 630 union members 
interviewed in major urban centres in five provinces.50 Respondents were drawn from 
the public sector (42%), metalworking (11%), chemicals and paper (11%), mining 
(8%), catering and retail (8%), clothing and textiles (8%), food (5%), communication 
(4%) and banking (2%).  
 Because of redundancies and job mobility, a panel study could not be conducted with 
the same respondents. Instead, a multi-layered sampling approach was adopted. In 
previous iterations of the survey large unionised workplaces were identified in each 
province and then randomly selected to ensure that the major COSATU unions 
operating in each province were represented. 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted in late 2008 and early 2009 at the same sites 
as the 2004 study where employers granted permission. Where this was not possible, 
workplaces were selected in the same sector to ensure that sectoral coverage woud be 
consistent with previous surveys. After employers granted access, a sample of ten union 
members was drawn randomly from each workplace. Although not ideal, the sampling 
strategy ensured that general trends could be identified. 
4.  RESULTS 
 
4.1 Accountability of shop stewards 
For ordinary members the union is given shape and meaning through their shop 
stewards who service grievances, provide information, influence how members vote 
and whether they attend meetings, and thus provide opportunities to interface with the 
union. If stewards are responsive to members' desires the union itself will be more 
effective and responsive. Furthermore, when members elect their shop stewards they 
are effectively evaluating their responsiveness and that of the union to their needs.51 
The questions in the survey primarily relate to the culture of participation between 
union members and shop stewards. The questions address the mandate that stewards 
operate with, the extent to which they are accountable to members and are expected to 
report back on decisions, and whether member should be able to replace stewards who 
do not represent their interests.  
Consistent with the surveys in 1998 and 2004, 92% of respondents reported that 
shop stewards were elected by workers rather than being appointed by the union or 
management. Tables 1, 2 and 3 reflect the expectations of workers on how the process 
of worker control should operate at the workplace. A comparison of the views of shop 
stewards and members on all three questions shows no statistically significant 
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differences, reinforcing the view that shop stewards and members have similar views 
on these questions. 52 
Table 1: Shop steward mandate 
A shop steward - 1994 1998 2004 2008 
-  can only do what the membership tells them to do 72% 50% 54% 46% 
- had discretion (choice) within a broad mandate Not 
asked 
20% 28% 30% 
- can represent your interests as s/he sees fit 26% 30% 18% 19% 
 
Table 1 indicates that the largest group of respondents still expects shop stewards to act 
as delegates who operate according to a direct mandate. What is significant, however, is 
that the proportion of respondents prepared to allow stewards to operate with an open 
mandate has declined markedly in the past two surveys. As shop stewards increasingly 
pursue their own interests rather than those of the membership, this may suggest lower 
levels of trust than in the first two surveys. 
Table 2: Shop steward accountability for decisions 
When shop stewards act on your behalf - 1994 1998 2004 2008 
- they must report back to workers every time  
Not 
asked 
76% 83% 78% 
- they must report back to workers only on 
important issues 
23% 17% 20% 
- they do not have to report back 1% 0% 1% 
 
The results in Table 2 indicate that minimal change has taken place over the past three 
surveys in the expectations that shop stewards need to be accountable and report back. 
However, a clear shift from specific to open mandating is evident in Table 3. Almost all 
members expect stewards to consult periodically, particularly regarding important 
issues. It is noteworthy that while the majority (54%) still expect stewards to consult 
every time they act on workers’ behalf, this has declined significantly since the first 
survey (76%), suggesting that the style of democracy on the shop-floor has been 
shifting from mandating to delegating. 
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Table 3: Consultation expectations of shop stewards 
A shop steward - 1994 1998 2004 2008 
- must consult every time s/he acts on behalf of 
workers 
76% 59% 63% 54% 
- must consult from time to time on important 
issues 
23% 40% 36% 40% 
- does not have to consult you because s/he is 
elected to represent your interests 
0% 1% 1% 2% 
 
The answers to these three questions indicate the extent to which the fundamental 
principle of steward accountability to members has become an ingrained expectation of 
shop-floor union culture, despite the shift from direct mandating to delegation. 
Table 4: Removal of non-performing shop stewards 
In your workplace, has a shop steward ever 
been removed by workers? 
1994 1998 2004 2008 
Yes 31 36 27 35 
No 69 59 66 56 
Do not know 0 5 7 8 
 
This stable pattern of accountability is reinforced by the finding that an overwhelming 
majority of respondents (93%) believe that shop stewards may be recalled by the 
membership if they do not do what the members want. This is consistent with previous 
surveys, and these views are shared by stewards and members alike. Members continue 
to replace non-performing stewards who have failed to fully represent their interests, as 
is shown in Table 4. There is an oscillating pattern over the four surveys indicating that 
members continue to exercise their power to remove shop stewards. What is unclear 
from the question is whether the removal of non-performing stewards has resulted 
from the withdrawal of the stewards’ mandate during his/her term of office or has 
taken place during periodic elections. 
4.2 Promotion of Stewards into Management 
The introduction of questions on the promotion of shop stewards into management in 
the 2004 survey for the first time recognised the well-established role of the position as 
a mechanism for climbing the organisational hierarchy. The practice has become more 
prevalent as the majority of respondents (52% versus 37% in 2004) now report 
instances of the promotion of stewards in their workplace (see Table 5). This also 




reflects the increasing preparedness or willingness of shop stewards to make 
themselves available for promotion into the managerial ranks. As the practice has 
become more common, the knowledge gap between stewards and members about the 
existence of promotions into management also has diminished. 
Table 5: Incidence of promotion into management 
Have shop 








Members Total Shop 
stewards 
Members  Total 
Yes 49% 33% 37% 59% 49% 52% 
No 49% 57% 55% 37% 38% 38% 
Do not know 2% 10% 8% 5% 11% 10% 
 
Table 6 indicates a moderate positive shift in the attitude of both shop stewards and 
members towards the acceptability of stewards being promoted into the managerial 
ranks. It is noticeable that the vast majority of shop stewards (74%) now agree that this 
behaviour is acceptable. The growing practice of promoting stewards into management 
not only raises the possibility of the erosion of internal solidarity but also brings into 
question the accountability of stewards to the membership. 
Table 6: Acceptability of shop stewards being promoted into management 
It is acceptable for 
shop stewards to 





Members Total Shop 
Stewards 
Members Total 
Strongly agree 36% 25% 28% 38% 30% 32% 
Agree 32% 32% 32% 36% 29% 31% 
Neutral/do not 
know 
8% 12% 11% 9% 11% 10% 
Disagree 11% 15% 14% 6% 14% 12% 
Strongly disagree 13% 16% 15% 12% 14% 14% 
 
Clearly, the historical animosity between unions and management ranks appears to be 
eroding as the practice of promotion becomes more acceptable and more common. 




However, if shop stewards are acting to advance their own careers rather than 
representing the interests of their members, the process of democratic accountability to 
the membership will necessarily be eroded over time. 
4.3  Member participation and participatory democracy 
In her seminal work on participatory democracy, Pateman argued convincingly that this 
form of democracy becomes self-sustaining because it socialises members into 
continuous participation by developing and fostering the skills they require to engage 
further.53 While attitudes and behavioural intentions of members are useful to 
understand the normative expectations of union members, it is member participation in 
a variety of union activities that determines whether the democratic culture is primarily 
participatory or representative. If the purpose of unions includes empowering members 
to help determine their employment conditions, one test of union effectiveness (not just 
democracy) is the extent to which members participate individually.54 
Unions depend on the support of the majority of members to support the activist 
core. This is particularly the case for COSATU affiliates that require high levels of 
participation to sustain the democratic culture discussed earlier. The range of measures 
that have been used to assess member participation typically focus on voting in 
elections for union representatives, office-bearers and officials, the frequency of 
attendance at union meetings, holding office as a shop steward or other official, and 
engaging in collective action. Where unions have formal and informal linkages with 
political parties and the community, union members, particularly shop stewards, wear a 
representative hat when they engage in these organisations. Participation of union 
members in other organisations, whether or not they wear a union hat, is integral to the 
notion of social movement unionism, which is founded on the articulation of labour, 
political and community struggles.  
Table 7: Frequency of shop steward elections 
 1998 2004 2008 
More than once a year 1% 3% 3% 
Once a year 33% 25% 22% 
Once in two years 29% 21% 17% 
Once in three years 31% 29% 40% 
More than three years ago 3% 9% 7% 
Cannot remember/do not know 1% 13% 7% 
                                               
53 Pateman Participation and democratic theory (1970).  
54 See Strauss (1991). 




The frequency of shop steward elections is measured using two questions. While the 
results in Table 7 suggest that the frequency of steward elections has declined steadily 
over the past three surveys, the results are not clear-cut when respondents were asked 
when they last elected their shop steward (Table 8). 73% indicated that they had voted 
within the past two years. No clear trend is evident as more respondents participated in 
elections in the past two years, compared with the 2004 survey, but the frequency of 
voting is lower than the 1998 survey. Overall, the results suggest less frequent elections, 
and presumably a more stable cohort of elected stewards.  
Table 8: Most recent participation in shop steward election 
When did you last participate in electing your 
shop steward? 
1998 2004 2008 
Within the last year 55% 46% 51% 
1-2 years ago 28% 16% 22% 
2-3 years ago n/a 13% 8% 
More than 2 years ago 13% n/a n/a 
More than 3 years ago n/a 8% 3% 
Never/ Cannot remember/ Do not know 5% 17% 13% 
The results in Table 9 indicate very clearly that weekly attendance at union meetings by 
both shop steward and members has declined markedly between 1998 and 2008. While 
the typical shop steward attended union meetings on a weekly basis in 1998, by 2008 
this had reduced to attendance on a monthly basis. Similarly, while one-third of 
ordinary members were attending meetings every week in 1998, this ratio has fallen to 
about one in six ordinary members a decade later.  
Table 9: Frequency of attendance at union meetings 
How frequently do you attend 
union meetings? 
Shop stewards Total Members 
1998 2004 2008 1994* 1998 2004 2008 
Once a week 55% 49% 38% 34% 37% 20% 17% 
Once a month 34% 47% 50% 43% 35% 46% 48% 
One to four times a year 2% 1% 6% 6% 10% 11% 14% 
Do not know/cannot remember/ 
never 
5% 2% 5% 18% 18% 23% 21% 
* Note: Shop stewards were not identified in the first survey 




The steady decline in intensity of involvement by ordinary members in the past decade 
points to a significant decline in union mobilisation and has important consequences for 
the sustainability of the democratic culture that sustained the model of worker control. 
It is also indicative of a steady shift from participatory democracy to a more 
representative style. Despite these significant declines, about two-thirds of ordinary 
members attend union meetings at least on a monthly basis, a high ratio by 
international standards. Regular meeting attendance is consistent across the sample 
with the majority of members in 12 of the 14 unions surveyed reporting that they still 
attend at least one union meeting per month. 
The participation of members in industrial action (see Table 10) represents a further 
measure of engagement in union activities. Although respondents were not asked 
whether they had personally participated in industrial action since 2004, two-thirds 
reported that there had been some strike activity at their workplace in the past four 
years. While there is no clear trend over the past decade, the results also do not support 
public perceptions that the level of strike activity in the public sector is much higher 
than activity in the private sector. The results also suggest that although large scale 
strikes in the private sector may not be common, industrial action persists in this 
context. 
Table 10: Participation in industrial action 
Have workers in 
this workplace 



















Yes 65% 70% 66% 58% 59% 58% 64% 72% 67% 
No 29% 27% 29% 39% 38% 38% 29% 22% 27% 
Don’t know 6% 2% 5% 3% 3% 3% 7% 6% 6% 
 
There are two ways to interpret this data. On the one hand, the overall pattern of 
participation in structured activities – shop steward elections, union meetings and 
industrial action – remains relatively high by historical standards and very high by 
international standards. This suggests that members of COSATU affiliates remain active 
participants in their unions. On the other hand, the significant decline in the intensity of 
activist-type participation, represented by attendance at weekly meetings, is suggestive 
of the erosion of the culture of participatory democracy. Just as active engagement 
becomes self-sustaining and creates an empowered and socialised membership, the 
steady decline in participation by ordinary members is disempowering and weakens 
the processes through which elected representatives can be held accountable, even if 
attitudes towards accountability remain largely unchanged.  




4.4  Alignment between values and priorities of shop stewards and 
members  
The third question that Strauss raises is whether or not shop stewards and office-
bearers reflect the values and priorities of their members. The reasons for alignment or 
misalignment may be varied, but the efficacy of democratic processes and practices is 
reflected in an alignment of views between members and their representatives. To 
some extent one would expect that the attitudes of elected stewards will be affected by 
exposure to different viewpoints and influences through the performance of their 
representative roles.  
In instances where democratic procedures are absent or weak, leaders and shop 
stewards may systematically misinterpret the preferences of workers because they base 
their choices on the preferences of an activist group or those who attend meetings most 
frequently. Similarly, the preferences of the majority of workers may not be represented 
by their elected representatives if they are expressing views on issues that have not 
been subjected to a process of validation through a worker vote.55 
While the majority of survey respondents are ordinary members, the survey includes 
a disproportionately large representation of shop stewards (26%). This provides a large 
enough group to compare their attitudes and behaviours with those of ordinary 
members, and thus establish to what extent shop stewards represent the interests of 
members. The areas of commonality are clearly as important as those where they differ.  
The survey results reveal that members and shop stewards share expectations about 
the relationship between members and their elected representatives. Both members 
and their representatives agree on the need for shop stewards to obtain mandates from 
the membership, to consult on decisions and on the frequency of feedbacks required. 
Moreover, an overwhelming majority of stewards and members (over 90%) recognised 
the right of members to remove stewards who have lost the confidence of the members. 
Together, these questions clearly suggest that procedural democratic principles are 
widely shared across COSATU affiliates, with the exception of SASBO (South African 
Society of Bank Officials) where there is limited evidence of a functioning structure of 
elected and accountable shop stewards. 
It is also noteworthy that ordinary members and shop stewards appear to be equally 
aware of the various committees or structures for workers to participate or 
communicate with management. However, there is a marked difference in beliefs about 
the impact of participation. 72% of shop stewards believe that that these bodies have 
some or extensive influence over management, while only 54% of members share these 
views. Almost half of shop stewards, who are more likely to be directly involved in these 
bodies, believe that participation results in extensive influence over management. Their 
experience of direct participation with management and the belief that they help 
workers gain some influence over management decisions, may determine the significant 
                                               
55 See Bacarro (2006). 




difference between ordinary members and shop stewards concerning promotions into 
management discussed earlier.  
These findings support the view that participation in employer consultation 
structures increases the distance between members and shop stewards. Not only do 
stewards appear to perceive that relationships with management are more effective but 
the attractiveness of a management position is likely to increase as perceived influence 
over management decisions increases.  
Levi et al56 further emphasise that, while the benchmark of participatory democracy 
is a high degree of participation in voting, meetings and policy debates, this is only truly 
meaningful if members are well informed. Knowledge of past policies and decisions and 
access to relevant information is essential for contributing to debates. This is consistent 
with the programme of Organisational Renewal that COSATU and its affiliates 
committed themselves to following, as recommended by the September Commission of 
1997.57 The programme’s aims include ensuring (a) that members are provided with 
excellent service in terms of political and labour-relations education and (b) that every 
affiliate maintains internal democracy through regular and well-attended constitutional 
meetings, support for shop stewards, and well-defined and effective report-back 
systems.  
Table 11: Members and shop stewards: Knowledge of government policy  
 Shop stewards Members  
 1998 2004 2008 1998 2004 2008 
Do you know what the Recon-
struction and Development 
Programme (RDP) is? 
92% 97% 88% 79% 87% 77% 
Do you know what the National 
Economic Development and 
Labour Council (NEDLAC) is? 
68% 61% 49% 28% 22% 23% 
Have you ever been at a 
meeting where there has been 
a report back on NEDLAC? 
59% 43% 21% 21% 14% 15% 
Do you know what the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribut-
ion Strategy (GEAR) is? 
60% 52% 41% 24% 30% 20% 
                                               
56 See Levi et al (2009). 
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 A Commission of Inquiry was appointed by COSATU in 1996, headed by Connie September, to assess 
the trade union movement’s position in relation to changes in the labour market: see A Bezuidenhout 
Towards global social movement unionism? Trade union responses to globalization in South Africa 
Discussion Paper DP/115/2000 (International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, 2000). 




As indicated in Table 11, there has been a precipitous decline overall in policy 
knowledge levels, with the exception of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), among both shop stewards and ordinary members. NEDLAC, the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council, provides a critical forum for 
organised labour to participate in the formulation of legislation and policy directly 
related to the interests of individual workers. Over the past decade the prominence of 
NEDLAC has declined as the volume of legislation and policy has receded. It is to be 
expected that, despite NEDLAC’s potential importance, there would be a decline in the 
proportion of members who are familiar with the institution or have attended meetings 
where there has been a report-back. COSATU’s deputy general secretary, Bheki 
Ntshalinshali, acknowledges that implementing democracy is complex and that 
continuous report-backs and mandating on issues dealt with at NEDLAC has not been 
part of union culture.58 
The declining level of knowledge among shop stewards, however, suggests that union 
educational efforts are having less impact and that grassroots leaders are increasingly 
marginalised from union decisions concerning broader policy issues.  Not surprisingly, 
the data also reveals significant differences between shop stewards and ordinary 
members in all the questions relating to knowledge about NEDLAC, GEAR and the RDP, 
as well as attendance at meetings where government policy and policy-making bodies 
were discussed. Although individual members are far removed from policy negotiations 
at NEDLAC, the limited participation of their representatives in meetings where policy 
issues are discussed raises substantive questions about the extent to which effective 
mandating processes are in place.  
The only question where the views of members and shop stewards are similar 
related to whether the government was achieving the goals of the RDP. Despite these 
differences, even among shop stewards a relatively low proportion had attended 
meetings where there had been any discussion of these issues. This highlights the likely 
gap on matters of policy and politics between union official, elected representatives and 
the membership. 
In comparison with ordinary members, shop stewards are more likely to (a) believe 
that unions should have active links with community organisations, civil society 
groupings, or social movements, (b) be involved in local government or community-
based development initiatives, and (c) be a member of the SACP. While only 18% of the 
ordinary members surveyed are signed-up or paid-up members of the SACP, more than 
40% of shop stewards are SACP members. This distinction is explored in depth later in 
the paper. Surprisingly, shop stewards are less likely than ordinary members to have 
attended a meeting of the political party they support.  
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Table 12: Members and shop stewards: Voting ANC and the Tripartite Alliance 
 Ordinary Members Shop stewards Total 
 1998 2004 2008 1998 2004 2008 1994* 1998 2004 2008 
Voting ANC 70% 70% 55% 89% 82% 67% 75% 75% 73% 58% 
Supporting the 
Alliance 




62% 64% 62% 70% 66% 70% 76% 64% 64% 64% 
* Note: Shop stewards were not identified in the 1994 survey. 
As the data in Table 12 suggests, support for the ANC remained remarkably stable until 
the pronounced decline in committed ANC support in 2008. Some of this can be 
attributed to the fact that 23% of the 2008 sample refused to answer the question, 
compared to only 16% in 2004. Further analysis of the provincial breakdown in support 
for the ANC reveals that the Western and Eastern Cape were solely responsible for the 
dramatic decline in expressed support. In the Western Cape only 20% declared their 
intention to vote for the ANC, while in the Eastern Cape only 31% did. The emergence of 
an ANC breakaway, the Congress of the People, and the strong shift from the ANC to the 
Democratic Alliance in the Western Cape, clearly played a role in the willingness of 
respondents to address the question in the run-up to the national election.  
To some degree the shift can also be ascribed an environment of political instability 
at the time of the survey, as approximately 40% of respondents in these provinces 
refused to answer this question. In the remainder of the provinces ANC support levels 
remained steady compared to the previous survey. While the gap between ordinary 
members and shop stewards remains about 12%, it is also significant that declining 
levels of support for the ANC among shop stewards was already evident in 2004.  
There is a potentially significant shift occurring in patterns of support for the 
Tripartite Alliance and support for the ANC among both members and stewards. 
Whereas previously support for the ANC was significantly higher than current and 
future support for the Tripartite Alliance, expressed support for the alliance is now 
stronger than support for the ANC itself. Given the professed importance of the alliance 
to COSATU and the high membership of the SACP, particularly among shop stewards 
(see Table 13), this may indicate that support for the alliance is linked to primary 
political allegiance to the SACP rather than the ANC.  
 
  























Eastern Cape 2% 15% 17% 14% 30% 
Gauteng 8% 18% 26% 16% 47% 
KwaZulu-Natal 9% 25% 34% 33% 50% 
North-West 







Western Cape 2% 6% 7% 5% 13% 
Total 7% 17% 23% 18% 40% 
Total excluding 
Western Cape 
7% 19% 27% 21% 45% 
4.5  SACP membership and union democracy 
The formation of the Tripartite Alliance formally established the association between 
COSATU and the SACP in 1990. Initially, however, much of the political work of the SACP 
was focused on building support for the ANC and many SACP leaders also held 
leadership positions in the ANC. Similarly, COSATU was instrumental in mobilising 
voter support for the ANC in the general elections. Despite this, the political influence of 
the SACP and COSATU in the Tripartite Alliance has often been marginal. This was most 
evident with the adoption of GEAR, a neo-liberal macro-economic policy, for the decade 
after 1996. 
The strengthening of the relationship between the SACP and COSATU in recent years 
(see Table 14 below) has been a natural and strategic result of a common agenda to 
advance a “Left strategy” devised to “capture the ANC” from within, “with the objective 
of shifting government strategy in a pro-poor and pro-working class direction”.60 The 
introduction of a question on SACP membership in the current survey enables us to 
explore in some depth the inter-relationship between SACP membership and trade 
union activism, and the role that left-wing shop stewards and activists may play in 
leading and sustaining shop-floor democracy and mobilisation. 
 
                                               
59 The percentages for the North-West province are influenced by the very small sample size (two 
workplaces). 
60 Southall & Webster “Unions and parties in South Africa: COSATU and the ANC in the wake of 
Polokwane” in Beckman and Sachikonye (eds) Trade unions and party politics in Africa (2010) at 147. 




Table 14: Membership of SA Communist Party per union 
Percentage who are 






SACP membership ratio - 
shop stewards: ordinary 
members 
NUMSA 57% 20% 2:8 
NUM 55% 38% 1:5 
SATAWU 55% 16% 3:5 
POPCRU 50% 27% 1:8 
SAMWU 50% 27% 2:2 
NEHAWU 47% 32% 1:5 
CEPPWAWU 33% 10% 3:2 
SACTWU 16% 5% 3:3 
SADTU 15% 10% 1:5 
SACCAWU 11% 17% 0:7 
Total 40% 18% 2:2 
The 12th Congress of the SACP revealed that the industrial employed working class 
represents under 40% of SACP membership.61 COSATU’s leadership highlighted that in 
order to strengthen their alliance with the SACP more work was required to convert 
members into staunch socialists who are active in the SACP.62 If membership of the 
SACP is accompanied by education and mobilisation, one might expect enhanced levels 
of political understanding among union members and activists.  
The most striking feature of the data in Table 13 is the high level of signed-up and 
paid-up membership of the SACP reported by shop stewards (45%) outside the Western 
Cape, compared to 21% for ordinary members.63 Of those who reported to be SACP 
members, 72% claimed to be paid up while 28% claimed to be signed up. If the data for 
ordinary members is to be believed and the sample is representative of COSATU as a 
whole, then the SACP has about 215,000 paid-up members and another 85,000 signed-
up members within COSATU. While the close relationship between COSATU and the 
SACP in recent years may have translated into significant cross-membership, this 
amounts to four times the claimed membership of the SACP at 73,000.64  
                                               
61 COSATU Political report to the tenth COSATU National Congress (2009) at 26. 
62 See COSATU Political report (2009). 
63 In aggregate over 70% of all respondents who indicated that they were SACP members claimed to be 
paid-up. 
64 Bell “Inside labour: Debate needed on COSATU's SACP agenda” (2009) Business Report.  




While the dominance of Marxist rhetoric is clearly evident in COSATU’s political 
discourse65 and SACP members are prominent in COSATU leadership positions, the data 
in Table 14 reveal the extent to which the SACP has recruited grassroots leadership 
throughout COSATU. This reflects the strengthening SACP-COSATU linkages within the 
Tripartite Alliance more generally. In the run-up to the ANC’s National Conference in 
Polokwane in December 2007, SACP and COSATU members made a concerted effort to 
infiltrate ANC branches across the country in order to ensure that their interests were 
fully represented in the ANC leadership race.66  
While the intensified alliance between the SACP and COSATU at top and grassroots 
leadership may strengthen their position in the Tripartite Alliance, it also raises 
questions about a potential representation gap on political issues, particularly in unions 
(such as NUMSA and SATAWU) where the majority of shop stewards are SACP members 
but only 20% of members claim to be.  
Table 15: Meeting attendance: Influence of SA Communist Party membership 
Frequency of 
attendance at union 
meetings 
Shop stewards Ordinary members 
SACP members Others SACP members Others 
Weekly 56% 26% 22% 16% 
Monthly 39% 60% 52% 47% 
1-4 times annually 3% 7% 10% 15% 
Don’t Know 2% 7% 16% 22% 
Total 100% (62) 100% (91) 100% (79) 100% (353) 
 
The data in Table 15 also suggest that SACP members are generally much more active 
participants in union affairs than workers who are not SACP members. The majority 
(60%) of shop stewards who attend union meetings on a weekly basis are SACP 
members, highlighting either the effectiveness of the SACP in recruiting among this 
activist group, or the importance of the SACP to sustaining relatively high levels of union 
participation among an activist group, in a context where the overall intensity of 
participation has declined markedly (see Table 9). In the absence of data on SACP 
membership in the earlier surveys it is not possible to establish patterns more 
conclusively. 
The question also arises as to why a large proportion of shop stewards and ordinary 
members indicate that they are SACP members when they probably are not. The idea 
that these SACP members are all genuine left-wing activists, who adopt an oppositional 
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attitude towards management and exclusively advance the interests of the working 
class, should probably be dispelled as an overwhelming majority (73%) of shop 
stewards now believe that it is acceptable for shop stewards to be promoted into 
management (see Table 6). 
Buhlungu’s study of full-time officials has highlighted the emergence of 
entrepreneurial and career unionists, in addition to the more traditional ideological 
unionists.67 There appears to be a similar pattern at the workplace where the position 
of shop steward may not only be utilised as a stepping stone into a full-time position as 
union official but increasingly to access opportunities in managerial ranks or in 
government. This suggests that in the majority of cases the decision to affiliate with the 
SACP is more likely to be pragmatic or opportunistic than ideological. As suggested by 
Southall and Webster, there are strong indications of political factions within COSATU 
behind the façade of unity. They argue that “factionalism could easily translate into a 
scramble for jobs” in government.68 Similarly, shop stewards may be using their SACP 
membership opportunistically to align with a union faction where the leadership is 
dominated by SACP members. Identification with an SACP-led faction may partly 
explain why so many respondents claim to be paid-up or signed-up SACP members, 
when they probably are not. 
4.6 Implications for union democracy 
Does the presence of a high proportion of SACP members among the shop stewards 
surveyed threaten or strengthen union democracy? On the one hand, from a liberal 
pluralist perspective one could argue that the presence of organised factions or 
platforms contesting for power within the union might represent the best defence 
against oligarchy. This argument presupposes that the existence of factions is well 
known to representatives with voting rights. Of course, many liberal pluralists may not 
be comfortable with the notion that a leading faction was communist. On the other 
hand, the election of representatives who may not directly reflect the interests or views 
of the members they represent may create problems of legitimacy and the potential for 
the union to pursue policies that do not reflect those of the majority of members.  
Alternatively, from an activist perspective, one may argue that an outside 
organisation like the SACP may sustain, stimulate or revive activism with the labour 
movement, enhancing the interests of all members. However, in COSATU affiliates there 
is no pure electoral democracy where members can vote directly for policies or national 
leadership candidates they prefer. Consequently, in participatory democratic systems 
where leaders are selected by elected representatives, the most active members 
dominate and may misrepresent the majority interests.  
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Writing about the British experience, Darlington notes that most shop stewards are 
elected because of their commitment to fight to advance workers’ interests at the 
workplace rather than because of their broader political beliefs.69 The more adversarial 
approach adopted by left-wing stewards may be valued by members irrespective of 
their political affiliation. Where stewards have been removed, the main reasons given in 
the survey is because they were not doing their job properly (60%) or were regarded as 
being too close to management (24%), rather than on ideological and political grounds 
(4%).  
Similarly, Bacarro70 argues that if unions pursue the “logic of mobilization” rather 
than the “logic of representation” and take action based on the members or 
representatives who are most willing to engage in collective action, the interests of the 
less-active majority may be ignored. In addition, activists and elected leaders use 
persuasion to influence members’ views as workers often rely on their leaders to 
evaluate alternative policy options, particularly when specialist knowledge is required. 
In the dialogue associated with democratic decision-making, leaders may also strongly 
influence members by (re-)shaping their perceptions of their own interests.71  
There is a significantly greater proportion of SACP members among shop stewards 
than among ordinary members in most COSATU unions. Consequently, some shop 
stewards may be advancing the interests of the party rather than the preferences of the 
majority of union members. This survey has not explored their reasons for joining the 
SACP or their impact of membership on the role as shop stewards. It thus remains a 
subject for further research to identify whether or not SACP membership serves to 
advance the interests of the members they represent. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
At twenty-six years old, COSATU and its affiliates are confronting the challenges of 
adulthood and organisational maturity that Michels recognised as the “iron law of 
oligarchy”. Buoyed by the exhilaration of youthful development during the democratic 
struggle era, many, including the author,72 drew overly optimistic conclusions about the 
ability of the adolescent COSATU to avoid the challenges of maturity and oligarchy. The 
federation of unions that has emerged into adulthood is more diverse, comprising an 
increasing proportion of public sector and better-educated workers, together with 
COSATU’s traditional blue-collar, semi-skilled industrial working class base.  
These unions have successfully embedded many of the founding principles of union 
democracy and worker control. However, although representative structures and 
democratic organisational principles remain in place, the vibrancy of intensive 
participation has transformed the type of union democracy that is practiced. Coupled 
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with the erosion of participation in civil society organisations in the democratic era, the 
displacement of established traditions of participatory union democracy with 
representative democracy in turn undermines the democratic control that members 
hold over their union leaders and federation leaders.  
Following the September Commission Report of 1997, COSATU’s programme of 
Organisational Renewal highlighted the importance of ensuring that affiliates maintain 
internal democracy through regular and well-attended constitutional meetings, support 
for shop stewards and well-defined and effective report-back systems.73 This strategy 
aimed to reverse the steady shift from participatory union democracy to a 
representative democracy as reported here. The inability of affiliates to effectively 
implement programmes that addressed these goals has been reiterated in COSATU 
Organisational Renewal reports that note the erosion of progressive union movement 
traditions and practices such as worker control.74  While internal democracy appears to 
have survived at the workplace level, the findings reported here are generally 
consistent with a recent NALEDI survey of COSATU affiliates highlighting that the 
“maintenance of internal democracy is lacking as there is poor attendance at 
constitutional meetings, [al]though affiliates still maintain effective mandating and 
report-back systems for collective bargaining.”75 
As affiliates mature, many members have become occasional participants in 
organised labour’s body politic rather than the pistons and cogs in the engine-room of 
the union machinery. As members have disengaged from daily union activities, 
“ownership” and control of the union has steadily shifted from members to elected 
representatives, factions and officials. Similarly, citizens express dissatisfaction about 
the remoteness of their political representatives, resulting in disempowerment and 
disaffection. 
In contrast, the power of participatory democracy lies in the virtuous cycle of 
empowerment that it fosters, particularly in developing the characteristics required of 
engaged citizens in a democratic society. Participatory democracy in unions in the 
1980s provided a classroom to strengthen commitment to democratic practice in the 
post-apartheid polity. As it has eroded over the past two decades, it remains unclear 
whether oligarchies have usurped power or are filling voids that were abandoned by 
the hyper-active membership in the 1980s. Irrespective, the rapidly declining intensity 
of participation among shop stewards, as measured by the frequency that they attend 
meetings, is of greatest concern for the prospects of union democracy.  
While attendance at union meetings by shop stewards and ordinary union members 
has declined markedly, members still hold shop stewards accountable, expect regular 
consultation and report-backs, and remove non-performing shop stewards. As frequent 
meeting attendance is replaced by periodic attendance, expectations of accountability 
necessarily transform and result in the hollowing-out of participatory democracy. As 
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stewards become representatives rather than delegates, members can only hold them 
accountable at election time or when they periodically need to remove non-performers.  
Whether members can expect that their representatives primarily serve their 
interests, rather than their personal ambitions, is moot. As shop stewards become 
increasing attracted into the managerial ranks, the emergence of careerists and 
entrepreneurs among union officials, as identified by Buhlungu,76 seems to be replicated 
among elected representatives. Given that shop stewards overwhelmingly support the 
promotion of shop stewards into the managerial ranks, SACP membership may be 
inspired by opportunism rather than ideology. Consequently, unions are not 
experiencing the kind of democratic revitalisation that one would expect to result from 
factional competition for grassroots leadership positions.  
For a movement as large as COSATU, judgment about the emergence of an oligarchy 
requires differentiated criteria appropriate to assessing participatory democracy in 
local decision-making and representative democracy over policy issues at the union or 
federation level. Any assessment of union democracy must take cognisance of the 
crucial distinction between participatory and representative democracy; i.e. between 
control over decisions and control over representatives.77 
Analysis needs to focus, firstly, on the extent to which elected representatives on 
COSATU’s and its affiliates’ Central Executive Committees are able to exercise effective 
control over full-time officials and, secondly, whether members broadly concur with the 
main policy decisions that the federation and its affiliates are pursuing. With support for 
the Tripartite Alliance remaining consistently high (close to two-thirds) over the past 
three surveys, it is hard to conclude at present that the policies of COSATU no longer 
have member support.  
There is no question about whether the governance structures of COSATU and its 
affiliates meet most criteria of constitutional democracy. However, other traditional 
measures of union democracy should be deployed to establish the extent to which 
democracy is practiced. This requires further research to address questions including 
the following: are members free to criticise and debate union officials and to organise, 
oppose, and replace officials through freely contested elections?78 Does the SACP 
operate openly as an organised faction or party within COSATU and affiliates? Are there 
opportunities for competing factions to compete for power, as suggested by Lipset et 
al?79 How close are elections for senior posts and how often are incumbent office 
bearers and officials voted out of office?80  
There is no doubt that the traditional model of worker control that characterised the 
early days of COSATU and its affiliates is being hollowed out. The structure of 
constitutional democracy remains in place but the effectiveness of both participatory 
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and representative union democracy depends on the mobilisation, participation and 
commitment of ordinary members to sustain it and to hold its leaders accountable. 
From a service-delivery perspective, declining participation may well reflect member 
satisfaction that union leaders are effectively advancing their interests. If members view 
unions instrumentally rather than as opportunities to practice democracy, then the 
idealised model of worker control built on the hyper-mobilisation of the 1980s may no 
longer be perceived as necessary in a labour movement that has reached maturity and 
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